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ABSTRACT 
The European Union and Singapore are vastly different entities, each with its own regional and global 
priorities and policies. Both actors employ a range of tools and instruments to aid in their foreign policy 
objectives, including in the projection of their soft power. It is worth analysing and comparing the 
specific instruments of these two actors’ soft power strategies, including but not limited to their stated 
objectives and perceived effectiveness. This paper will compare the role of higher education and 
scholarships in diffusing soft power through a comparative case study of the Erasmus Mundus 
scholarship program and the Singapore Scholarship administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It 
will look at the ways in which these programs have shaped the standing of the actors in diffusing their 
norms and objectives in the regional and international arena. A comparative analysis of these programs 
will hopefully provide some insight into the proximity between foreign policy-making and higher 
education internationalisation. This paper will begin with an overview of the aforementioned programs 
and related schemes, before dissecting and comparing the intent and the policy-making processes 
behind these, and concludes with a discussion on the present and future role of higher education as a 
strategic soft power tool. 
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HIGHER EDUCATION SCHOLARSHIPS AS A SOFT 
POWER TOOL: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS ROLE IN THE 
EU AND SINGAPORE 
 
CHARLES CHIA SHENG-KAI1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
An article last year for the online newspaper 
University World News raised pertinent questions 
about higher education internationalisation and its 
situation within diplomatic and soft power 
paradigms (Knight 2014). The author left open-
ended issues about the place of higher education 
in public diplomacy and its framing in terms of soft 
power. While these questions of framing higher 
education are not the focus of this research paper, 
it opens the door for a more nuanced analysis of 
the current higher education landscape and its part 
in the soft power strategies of the European Union 
(EU) and Singapore. More specifically, a look at two 
of the scholarships offered by both actors will 
provide us with some insight into the strategic 
intent behind these programs and how they fit into 
the larger field of foreign policymaking and public 
diplomacy. 
 
This working paper will first introduce the concept 
of soft power and how it relates to the field of 
public diplomacy. The use of scholarships and 
other exchange programs by other actors such as 
the US and UK will be briefly mentioned before the 
paper delves into the specifics of the EU’s and 
Singapore’s higher education programs and 
scholarships. For the purpose of this essay, the 
Erasmus Mundus and Singapore Scholarship have 
been chosen for comparison as they are the 
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from workshop participants. Email: 
charleschiask@gmail.com. The views expressed in this 
working paper are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the EU or the EU Centre in Singapore. 
Any shortcomings or errors are solely the author’s. 
preeminent scholarships available for prospective 
foreign students contemplating higher education in 
the EU and Singapore respectively. A 
comprehensive look at these scholarships will 
include an examination into their origins, strategic 
intent, program design, desired outcomes and 
overall prioritisation as a part of each actor’s 
foreign policy. A comparative analysis will follow 
and the discussion thereafter shall delineate how 
soft power is wielded differently by the EU and 
Singapore in this respect. 
 
Soft Power 
 
The term ‘soft power’ was first coined by Joseph 
Nye (1990) in his book Bound to Lead: The 
Changing Nature of American Power. It was further 
developed when Nye (2004a) dedicated a book to 
explain the concept in Soft Power: The Means to 
Success in World Politics. Nye defines soft power as 
“the ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments”, and 
this “arises from the attractiveness of a country’s 
culture, political ideals, and policies” (Nye 2004a: 
x). This power lies in “getting others to want the 
outcomes that you want… (and) the ability to 
shape the preferences of others” (Nye 2004a: 5). 
When a foreign audience respects and admires a 
country’s practices, values and ideals, soft power is 
taking root. Nye (2011: 84) further explains that 
there are three sources of soft power for countries 
to draw on – cultural, political and foreign policies. 
 
The essence of soft power, however, has existed for 
centuries longer. Nye (2011: 81-82) cites the spread 
of French culture in the 18th century as having 
contributed to expanding its power, as well as 
Chinese, Prussian, British and American examples 
of the embodiment of those same ideas. One of 
the more prominent contemporary examples 
offered by Nye of soft power having a ripple effect 
is the case of Alexander Yakovlev. The late senior 
adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev spent a year on 
exchange at Columbia University in his earlier days 
and this apparently impacted him, eventually 
influencing Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and 
glasnost (Nye 2011: 96).  
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In the most recent decade, a host of events and 
phenomena have seen the notion on soft power 
proliferate in academia, government, media and 
even in public discourse. Articles abound in 
publications like Foreign Policy and online media 
such as gulfnews.com, focusing particularly on 
American, Indian and Chinese soft power in the 
context of larger geopolitical shifts in economic 
might (Mullen & Ganguly 2012; Dinda 2015). 
Global affairs and lifestyle magazine Monocle has 
begun publishing an annual soft power survey in 
collaboration with the Institute for Government 
(2010) in the UK, and even public relations firm 
Weber Shandwick (2014) has adopted the concept 
as a cornerstone of its research and practice. 
 
Changes in technologies and socio-economic 
structures over the past decade have enabled and 
accelerated the mediums through which soft 
power is diffused. These include the increasing 
ubiquity of broadband and wireless internet, the 
exponential growth of social media, the 
introduction of low-cost carriers, and a rising 
middle-class in a fast-developing Asia more 
generally. The British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) cited statistics from the World Tourism 
Organisation in its report last year stating that 
international trips by Chinese travellers alone had 
exploded “from 10 million in 2000 to 83 million in 
2012” (BBC 2014). These trends indicate that there 
is now an unprecedented surge in the global flows 
of knowledge and people; new networks and 
platforms for knowledge exchange are being 
created on a regular basis and diverse people-to-
people interactions are growing tremendously as a 
result of the tourism boom, increased migration 
and new media technologies. In a world more 
globalised than ever, competing ideas and norms 
are spreading faster and wider, hence ensuring that 
the wielding of soft power is a hotly contested one 
in which actors – state and non-state – are 
employing or at least considering all available 
avenues to secure their positions of influence. 
With this frame of reference in mind, it becomes 
evident that higher education, as one of those 
avenues, could play a significant role. This is 
especially so as there is a rising demand for and 
growing internationalisation of higher education. 
Soft Power and Higher Education 
 
The major Anglosphere countries like the United 
States, United Kingdom and Australia have for 
some time recognised the soft power potential of 
scholarships and other higher education initiatives 
in reaching out to an international public. Many of 
the international students on scholarships are 
potential leaders who eventually return to their 
home countries to take up senior positions in the 
public and private sectors where they contextualise 
and diffuse the knowledge learnt through their 
university education. The Fulbright Program, 
Chevening Awards and Colombo Plan Scholarships 
are some of the examples through which 
governments utilised higher education as a mode 
of development assistance as well as diffusing their 
norms through educational exchange. 
 
Stetar et al (2010: 193) note that a country’s 
education system conveys norms and values not 
just through institutional collaborations but also by 
students “bringing with them the perspective of 
the country where they were educated” back 
home, and often further afield as they progress 
professionally. Shields and Edwards (2010: 237) 
observe that the “pattern of student mobility from 
periphery to core countries has been widely 
accepted as a mutually beneficial, or symbiotic, 
relationship”. Host countries get to realise their 
foreign policy objectives, tap on an added pool of 
skilled labour, and diversify revenue streams for 
the higher education institution; on the other 
hand, new skills and knowledge networks are 
gained by those from the sending countries 
(Altbach 1989: 127). There is therefore a general 
consensus that these educational exchanges 
provide a largely positive outcome for all the 
parties involved. 
  
More attention has been paid in recent years to 
trends in the internationalisation of higher 
education and the connection this has to the 
contest for global influence. Higher education 
researchers have pointed out that building soft-
power is a key strategic function in the 
development of education hubs around the Asia 
Pacific region. Some scholars focus particularly on 
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the “influence of high-quality human capital, local 
and global human network, and high-valued 
intellectual capacity” elements of soft power in 
forming “an intangible regional network and 
leadership position, which will extend its long-term 
political, cultural, and social impacts in the region 
and beyond” (Cheng, Cheung & Yuen 2011: 481-
482). Others like Mok (2012: 226) acknowledge the 
development of education hubs as a vital policy 
tool for states to assert soft power in an ever more 
competitive global marketplace. Further, Deodato 
and Borkowska (2014: 5) argue that Universities 
have traditionally risen above violent and 
ideological conflict happening around them to 
offer “an unbiased perspective on historic, political, 
cultural and economic issues… (where an) 
exchange of ideas, information, arts and culture on 
the one hand and the cascade effect of education 
on the other facilitate the academic soft power 
performance.” This means that universities can 
serve as potentially important neutral bridges 
between otherwise unfriendly nations, brandishing 
soft power in a subtle yet profound manner. 
 
The nexus between higher education, development 
assistance and foreign policy is an area that is 
worth exploring to see how the different objectives 
and goals are reconciled, and to tease out the 
underlying assumptions in the policy making.  Bu 
(cited in Shields & Edwards 2010: 236) observes 
that “thirty-three universities with the highest 
foreign student enrolment (forty-two per cent of 
total foreign student population) were also most 
heavily involved in… university contracts for foreign 
aid”. Herein, trickier questions arise as to the 
appropriateness for higher educational institutions 
to be perceived as vehicles for a state’s political 
agenda. There is indeed an inherent tension in the 
relationship between governments and universities 
in that it is sometimes unclear as to who wields the 
ultimate authority – often unspoken and implicit – 
in how major, if at all, a role the institutions play 
within a state’s foreign policy agenda. These 
complex issues, unfortunately, will not be 
addressed in this paper but is worthy of further 
exploration by scholars in the field. 
 
 
Singapore Scholarships 
 
Singapore is a modern city-state with a 
Westminster system of unicameral parliamentary 
government. It is situated at the southern tip of the 
Malayan peninsula in South-East Asia and has a 
land area of 718km2 with a population of 5.5 
million people. With a high population density, 
more than 80 per cent of its residents live in high-
rise public housing (Singapore Department of 
Statistics 2014). The country became fully 
independent in 1965 after an exit from the 
Federation of Malaya due to political 
disagreements. Singapore’s five decades of broad 
political stability facilitated rapid growth and 
resulted in it becoming one of the world’s most 
competitive economies today. The country figures 
highly in a variety of international rankings – the 
highest quality of life ranking in Asia (Mercer 
2014), 14th in the Country Brand Index 
(FutureBrand 2013) and most liveable location in 
Asia (ECA International 2015). 
 
Singapore’s foreign policy is centred on an acute 
sense of vulnerability and the geopolitical realities 
of the region it finds itself in. As a small island 
state, it prioritises the need to maintain friendly 
relations with a multitude of countries and 
participates actively in multilateral platforms and 
organisations like the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Its foreign policy is realist in 
essence and embodies an overarching sense of 
pragmatism. Some of the fundamental principles of 
Singapore’s foreign policy as spelt out in the MFA 
website include: 
 
• maintaining a credible and deterrent 
military defence; 
• promoting and working for good relations 
with her neighbours in all spheres; 
• fully supporting and committing to ASEAN; 
• maintaining a free and open multilateral 
trading system; 
• working to maintain a secure and peaceful 
environment in and around Southeast Asia 
and in the Asia Pacific region 
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In a speech at a ‘Singapore Perspectives’ 
conference recently, policy adviser and 
Ambassador-at-Large Bilahari Kausikan (2015) 
stressed that “the creation and maintenance of 
relevance must be the over-arching strategic 
objective of small states”; thus for Singapore to 
survive and thrive, it has to continue cultivating 
relevance through means of economic success and 
credibility, including the need for an effective 'hard 
power’ foundation through an advanced military 
force. With this frame of reference, it becomes 
evident that to maintain a competitive edge, 
Singapore has had to craft a niche for itself in as 
many fields as it competently can. As a way of 
preserving and extending this competitive edge, 
Singapore also utilises soft power to expand its 
foreign policy space so as to wield greater 
influence in areas from economic and monetary 
affairs to political and security dialogue.  
 
In Singapore’s public service magazine Challenge, 
Cheney (2013: 11 - 15) described the ways in which 
Singapore has sought to capture the hearts and 
minds of regional neighbours and to a wider 
extent, her international friends. This is done 
through institutions such as Civil Service College 
International and platforms including the 
Singapore Cooperation Programme (SCP). The SCP 
was set up in 1992 as “the primary platform 
through which Singapore offers technical 
assistance… in human resource development and 
economic development… with other countries in 
lieu of providing direct financial assistance” 
(Singapore Cooperation Programme 2015a). 
 
The Singapore Scholarship is housed under the SCP 
and administered primarily by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. It was launched in 1998 in the 
immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crisis 
for students of ASEAN countries to pursue a full-
time undergraduate degree in Singapore with the 
explicit expectation that scholars are to contribute 
to the development of their home countries upon 
graduation. Applicants compete on academic 
merit, are required to have a good command of 
English, and obtain the endorsement of their 
respective governments. The bond-free Singapore 
Scholarship is relatively generous – it covers full 
tuition and designated accommodation fees, a 
living allowance and a return airfare (Singapore 
Cooperation Programme 2015b). Now in its 17th 
year, the Singapore Scholarship is a prominent 
display of Singaporean goodwill and showcases the 
priority given to the cultivating of relationships 
with future leaders in the ASEAN region (Leong 
2007: 30). There is an absence of available data on 
the number of scholarships granted to date, but a 
2009 news report stated that 32 scholarships were 
granted that year with 520 scholarships given out 
in total (32 Awarded Scholarships 2009: 12). 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014) was 
projected to spend S$105.01 million for Financial 
Year 2014 “for transfers, which includes technical 
assistance provided under the Singapore 
Cooperation Programme, contributions to the UN 
Regular Budget, Peacekeeping Operations, and 
humanitarian aid”. This is slightly more than 20 per 
cent of the Ministry’s total projected expenditure 
for 2014 and should be considered significant for a 
small island state. As a recurring budget item, the 
SCP is a mainstay of the Ministry’s annual work 
plan, and the Singapore Scholarships is 
administered as part of the SCP.  A number of 
points should be noted. 
 
Firstly, the recurring nature of the Scholarships 
means that Singapore has permanently 
incorporated it into its annual program. As a part of 
the foreign ministry’s agenda, it indicates that 
education diplomacy is and has been very much a 
part of its overall strategy for some time now, small 
and targeted as it may be. Secondly, the 
Scholarships are a significant outlay for the 
Ministry without guaranteed or readily measurable 
benefits to Singapore. Certainly, the selection 
process is stringent and would likely be targeted at 
students with the potential to take on leadership 
positions across the ASEAN region. It should not be 
taken for granted, however, that scholars will take 
a natural liking to Singapore as some may have 
come to expect. In that regard, Singapore – like the 
US or UK – is taking a long-term gamble that the 
Scholarships will boost a foreigner’s positive 
perception of the country and intangible benefits 
will arise as a result. This may occur through future 
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business investments or policy decisions, a better 
understanding of Singapore’s policies, and publicity 
for the country through word of mouth. 
 
The signals are mixed, however. In 2003, the 
Education Workgroup of the Economic Review 
Committee’s Services Sub-Committee submitted a 
substantial proposal to develop a Global 
Schoolhouse concept in Singapore. It 
recommended a comprehensive development of 
the international education sector in Singapore 
with the objective of creating a self-sustaining 
education ecosystem that could contribute more 
significantly to economic growth, address 
capability development and attract talent to the 
country. There was almost no mention of the soft 
power potential or strategic intent, if any, of such 
an endeavour, save for a line or two about 
attracting talent so as to “build a strong network of 
international alumni around the world” (Ministry 
of Trade and Industry 2003). It appeared therefore 
that the economic realities of maintaining a 
competitive edge overshadow any soft power 
narratives surrounding these undertakings. 
 
Further, the Singapore Scholarship is but one of 
many others offered to international students via 
other agencies and government-linked 
corporations. These range from ASEAN 
Scholarships offered at the secondary and pre-
university level by the Ministry of Education to the 
Singapore International Graduate Award jointly 
offered by the Agency for Science, Technology and 
Research and three local Universities. However, a 
key difference is that the Singapore Scholarship is 
one of the rare scholarships, if not the only, that 
does not require scholars to work in Singapore 
after graduation. Considering this from a holistic 
perspective, the aim of most scholarships 
distributed is hence more linked to the competition 
for talents and targeted at generating a talent pool 
for the purposes of driving different sectors of the 
economy forward while supplementing an ageing 
workforce amidst demographic shifts. 
 
In terms of strengthening the soft power of 
Singapore, the foreign ministry and other agencies 
undertake other activities as and when it is apt. 
These range from humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HADR) efforts after the Boxing Day 
tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia to organising a 
forthcoming Singapore Festival in France to 
celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations between 
the two countries. The former was anchored by the 
Singapore Armed Forces while the latter sees the 
involvement of the National Heritage Board and 
Arts Council. The diversity of agencies involved in 
these efforts abroad speaks to the wide-ranging 
methods through which soft power can be 
projected. Taking these into account, the Singapore 
Scholarship is therefore a comparatively minor tool 
in the country’s overall soft power strategy. It 
naturally attracts less international media focus 
and the resulting benefits tend to be less 
pronounced. As a foreign policy tool, the Singapore 
Scholarship is a targeted approach at projecting 
soft power in Singapore’s regional neighbourhood. 
 
Erasmus Mundus Scholarships 
 
The European Union (EU) is a distinctive actor on 
the global stage. It is neither a state nor an 
international organisation per se. A cursory search 
for a standard explanation of what the EU is will 
reveal that there is no one set answer. The EU 
describes itself as “a unique economic and political 
partnership between 28 European countries” (EU 
2015). Spread out over four million square 
kilometres, the EU has more than 500 million 
inhabitants and operates as a single market. Key 
institutions that ensure the smooth functioning of 
the EU include the European Commission, 
European Council and European Parliament. 
 
The EU’s foreign policy is often seen as a confusing 
mix of various interwoven aims, principles and 
strategies. The Treaty of Lisbon came into force in 
2009, paving the way for the establishment of the 
European Union External Action Service (EEAS) in 
2011. The EEAS has responsibility for the EU 
Delegations around the world and at the same 
time has to coordinate and/or communicate the 
work of the Commission in those matters relating 
to external relations and has impact on its foreign 
affairs.  While some policies are firmly under the 
domain of EEAS such as  the Common Foreign and 
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Security Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy, 
development and humanitarian aid, there are 
other policies such as trade with a clear external 
dimension, and in this case,  the central theme of 
this paper – education, which have bearing on 
perceptions of the EU as a global actor. The EU’s 
external policies do have four key aims despite the 
complexity of the task – “they support stability, 
promote human rights and democracy, seek to 
spread prosperity, and support the enforcement of 
the rule of law and good governance” (EEAS 2015). 
 
The Erasmus Mundus program was reorganised in 
2014 and now falls under the new Erasmus+ 
programme (which also includes the Jean Monnet 
Activities). The wider policies related to education 
are managed by the European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Education and Culture (DG 
EAC) while the Education, Audiovisual and Culture 
Executive Agency (EACEA) is in charge of “the 
complete life-cycle management of projects” 
(EACEA 2015). The Erasmus Mundus Joint Master 
Degree (EMJMD; previously Erasmus Mundus 
Master Courses) typically run for between one to 
two years with a consortium of usually three to five 
higher education institutions offering different 
courses to students. Students graduate with joint 
or multiple degrees awarded by the consortium 
institutions which they have attended. A 
prospective student will first have to be accepted 
into their chosen Masters program before being 
considered by the consortium institutions for the 
scholarship. The bond-free scholarship covers full 
tuition fees, as well as a travel, relocation and 
subsistence allowance. As of 2013, close to 14000 
European and non-European students have taken 
part in the Erasmus Mundus programme with more 
than 900 scholarships offered, the majority of 
which went to non-Europeans (EACEA 2014). 
 
The Erasmus Mundus programme started slightly 
over a decade ago in its first phase from 2004 to 
2008 and is now in its third version. Decision 
2317/2003/EC (EC 2003) established the first phase 
of Erasmus Mundus and some of the objectives 
relevant to this paper are articulated in Article 3: 
 
 
• to enhance the quality of European higher 
education by fostering cooperation with 
third countries in order to improve the 
development of human resources and to 
promote dialogue and understanding 
between peoples and cultures; 
• to promote a quality offer in higher 
education with a distinct European added 
value, attractive both within the European 
Union and beyond its borders; 
• to improve accessibility and enhance the 
profile and visibility of higher education in 
the European Union 
 
In the second phase of the programme, Decision 
1298/2008/EC (EC 2008) set out the objectives of 
the Erasmus Mundus 2009-2013 programme in 
Article 3, with the relevant points as follows: 
 
• … to promote intercultural understanding 
through cooperation with third countries, in 
accordance with EU external policy 
objectives in order to contribute to the 
sustainable development of third countries 
in the field of higher education; 
• to improve accessibility and enhance the 
profile and visibility of European Union 
higher education in the world as well as its 
attractiveness for third-country and 
European nationals 
 
Finally, in the latest phase, Erasmus Mundus was 
incorporated under an overarching Erasmus+ 
programme and brand. In this instance, there were 
no Erasmus Mundus-specific objectives clearly 
delineated. However, parts of Article 4 and 5 of 
Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 (EC 2013) 
establishing Erasmus+ outline some of the 
objectives that are relevant: 
 
• the sustainable development of partner 
countries in the field of higher education; 
• the promotion of European values in 
accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union; 
• to enhance the international dimension of 
education and training… by increasing the 
attractiveness of European higher 
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education institutions and supporting the 
Union's external action, including its 
development objectives, through the 
promotion of mobility and cooperation 
between the Union and partner-country 
higher education institutions and targeted 
capacity-building in partner countries 
 
An analysis of these objectives over the lifespan of 
the Erasmus Mundus programme and its 
constituent scholarship reveals some interesting 
observations. Firstly, terminology has shifted from 
‘third’ to ‘partner’ country, possibly to remove any 
association between ‘third country’ and ‘third 
world’. Further, a ‘partner country’ connotes a 
more equal and mutually beneficial relationship. 
Secondly, there has been consistent emphasis on 
cooperation between higher education institutions 
within and without the EU. This cooperation is 
done mainly through capacity-building and 
ensuring sustainable development in higher 
education. Thirdly, the promotion of European 
values has been more explicitly identified over the 
phases. This is especially so in the latest Regulation 
which advocates the promotion of said European 
values as laid out in Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union. These values include “respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities…. 
common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women 
and men prevail” (EU 2012). 
 
With these strategic objectives as a frame of 
reference, the Erasmus Mundus programme and 
scholarship as a soft power tool comes into clearer 
focus. There is a pronounced effort to utilise the 
programme and scholarship as a way of bridging 
inequalities in educational opportunities. More 
importantly, there is an underlying drive to 
enhance the attractiveness and appeal of European 
higher education as well as Europe in general. This 
use of higher education institutes to attract 
international students to Europe is certainly one 
that is appealing to many, as can be seen from the 
statistics. What is more interesting is the sense that 
international students would quite naturally be 
able to identify with ‘European’ norms and values – 
a concept that the EU has indeed been attempting 
to craft over the past decades. This idea is 
appealing from a distance because the Erasmus 
Mundus study scheme and scholarship allows 
students to live the experience of these ‘European 
values’. As evidenced in the synthesis report on the 
first generation Erasmus Mundus program by 
EACEA (2013), the objectives mentioned for the 
program were to “contribute to the European 
higher education convergence process” and 
“increasing the worldwide attractiveness of 
European universities”. The projection of soft 
power is not as explicitly stated in this case, but the 
latter objective matches what was just discussed. 
 
Rasmussen (2009: 19-20) argues that the EU efforts 
to “influence foreign discourses is diffuse in nature 
and therefore more difficult to pin down”, citing 
the Erasmus Mundus as an initiative which does 
not force a change but rather facilitates the 
environment necessary for outsiders to perceive 
and experience its norms and values from within. 
He further acknowledges the programme as “a 
public diplomacy effort aimed at improving the 
understanding of the EU’s values” (Rasmussen 
2009, p. 20). Manners and Whitman (2013: 192) 
assert that the Erasmus Mundus program 
promotes “transference diffusion (which) facilitates 
a deeper sharing of minds than almost any other 
form of Public Diplomacy”, suggesting also that 
there are several modes of diffusion in a normative 
approach to public diplomacy which the EU has 
practiced through its various programmes. 
Botonero (2013:  5) explored the role of other EU 
higher education programs such as Tempus in 
diffusing soft power and likewise concludes that 
the EU does consider higher education to be “an 
effective source of soft power… able to influence 
the global political agenda”. 
 
As discussed, the Erasmus Mundus program offers 
the EU an avenue for asserting its normative power 
as a global actor. It is but one of the many 
instruments it taps upon within the education 
agenda to pursue a varied number of objectives 
ranging from higher education convergence within 
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and in its neighbourhood, the promotion of 
European values and the sustainable development 
of higher education in partner (or ‘third’) countries. 
The scholarship adds value and impetus to the 
program by ensuring an equality of opportunity 
amongst applicants of all means, as well as 
maintaining a broad geographic representation of 
students to foster diversity. These considerations 
make the scholarship program one that is open and 
diverse, ensuring broad impact across a large field 
of disciplines and areas. The Erasmus Mundus 
Graduate Impact Survey further offers us some 
insight into the ultimate impact of the program on 
students. In the latest survey, about one in four 
graduates state that the greatest impact of the 
program was on their attitude towards Europe and 
the EU (EMA 2014: 18). While it does not ascertain 
if this impact leans toward the positive or negative, 
the results highlight that the program does 
influence some of the views on the EU.  
 
A Comparative Analysis 
 
Similarities and differences abound in the manner 
with which the EU and Singapore utilise 
scholarships as a soft power strategy. The key 
similarity is that both scholarships are bond-free. 
This is the norm across similar scholarships 
provided by the US or UK governments, in which 
scholars are encouraged to return to their home 
country to contribute to the country’s 
development and inter-state relations. However, 
this latter point is not as overtly emphasised in the 
Erasmus Mundus scholarship. The similarities seem 
to end here upon closer analysis, and the 
differences are outlined in the table below. 
 
Scholarship 
Type 
Erasmus 
Mundus 
Singapore 
Agency/Ministry
-in-charge 
DG Education & 
Culture and 
EACEA 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
Launched 
 
2004 1998 
Objectives (key 
phrases as 
publicly 
available) 
 
 
Promote 
European values; 
increase EU 
appeal; support 
cooperation and 
mobility 
Contribute to the 
development of 
home countries 
Eligibility Unrestricted Restricted to non-
Singaporean 
ASEAN nationals 
endorsed by their 
respective 
governments 
Coverage Tuition fees 
€1000 per month 
€1000 - €4000 
per year for 
travel and 
relocation costs 
Tuition fees 
S$4300 per 
Academic Year 
One return airfare 
Accommodation 
allowance 
Study 
Restrictions 
Any discipline as 
offered by higher 
education 
consortiums 
Any discipline as 
offered by 3 local 
Universities except 
Medicine, 
Dentistry, 
Architecture and 
Law 
Target Group Any nationality 
with some 
benchmarks for 
geographical 
diversity 
ASEAN citizens 
Education Level Postgraduate Undergraduate 
Course Length  1 – 2 years 3 – 4 years 
Mobility 
requirements 
Transnational 
study in at least 
2 European 
countries 
Further overseas 
exchange/ 
attachments 
permitted but not 
covered 
 
Clear differences arise once the two scholarship 
programs are placed side by side. The Singapore 
Scholarship format could be described as more 
targeted in its approach and simpler in a broad 
sense, while the Erasmus Mundus program caters 
to a wider range and is inherently more 
multifaceted in course delivery and choice. There 
appears to be a greater prominence of the Erasmus 
Mundus scholarship as well, owing to its more 
international and diverse nature. A cursory analysis 
of online media coverage of both scholarships 
reveals that the Erasmus Mundus program receives 
much greater prominence on wider platforms than 
the Singapore Scholarship. The latter is framed 
through an economic / development lens with the 
consequent benefits of the program writ large 
emphasised while the former is framed under 
narratives of student mobility, intercultural 
understanding and values promotion. With that 
said, the intent behind the Singapore Scholarship is 
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arguably more economic in the overall scheme of 
analysis. 
 
In terms of projecting soft power, the EU is more 
overt and official than Singapore in terms of 
elucidating its objectives, for example through legal 
EU decisions, regulations and so forth. The foreign 
policy of the EU, however, is one that is highly 
complex and still evolving. It is a recent but active 
global actor with diverse aims requiring the 
considerable political will of 28 Members States to 
move forward in unity. A recent policy review (EU 
2014) suggested the need for the EU to “become a 
more flexible foreign policy player that operates 
with a clear strategic narrative, but can adapt to 
rapidly evolving global contexts.” The soft power 
projection of the EU is thus well and alive but 
requires a more coherent and consistent approach. 
 
On the other hand, Singapore tends to expound its 
positions and wield its influence in a more subtle 
manner. For example, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs explained the philosophy behind the 
Singapore Cooperation Programme – of which the 
Singapore Scholarship is a part of – in a keynote 
speech at the programme’s twentieth anniversary 
celebrations. These are namely to give back to the 
international community after having received 
technical assistance in its developing years, to 
further Singapore’s enlightened self-interest 
through mutual benefit, and to build goodwill and 
trust with other countries which would help it in 
international and regional fora (Shanmugam 2012). 
 
The differing intent and approaches with which the 
EU and Singapore adopt scholarships and higher 
education programs as a vehicle for soft power 
projection in effect reflects the competing policy 
priorities within its institutions. It is often said that 
the plethora of other higher education initiatives 
promulgated by the EU serve to establish and 
reinforce a common European identity, and this 
same identity is further diffused internationally 
through programs such as Erasmus Mundus. This 
does not seem to be the case in Singapore, where 
higher education scholarships tend not to 
enunciate the need to foster an enhanced foreign 
understanding of Singaporean history or identity. 
Instead, there is a strong initial focus on talent 
development and retention for the purpose of 
workforce augmentation. The deployment of soft 
power to attract talent hence appears to be more 
of an afterthought rather than a multi-pronged 
strategy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Monocle (2014) has ranked Singapore in the top 
20–30 bracket for soft power strength over a five 
year period. It has tumbled overall, however, from 
a high of 13th in 2010 to 23rd in the 2014/15 
survey. While the metrics used by Monocle could 
be debated, it does offer us a good estimate of 
Singapore’s influence in the world. In that regard, it 
raises the question of the EU’s place in such 
surveys were it to be included. There are 
unsurprisingly a significant number of European 
countries in the top rankings, but it would be a 
difficult task to rank the EU as a whole. It remains 
to be seen if the EU can forge an internationally 
recognised identity not solely reliant on its legal 
and political foundations. The cultivation of a 
common European identity based on shared values 
is tenuous at best, as we witness the re-
nationalisation of politics and the rise of far right 
parties creeping out of the fringe and moving into 
the mainstream of politics.  
 
This research paper has discussed the nature of 
soft power, its connection to higher education, and 
the roles scholarships have played in how the EU 
and Singapore project themselves to the world. 
The EU and Singapore are not the only ones 
turning to scholarships or internationalising higher 
education as an avenue to promote their values or 
foster goodwill, as China has aggressively pursued 
similar paths to achieve its objectives as well. It is 
still too early for the effect of these scholarships to 
be felt as graduates need time to rise in seniority 
and take on leadership roles in public and private 
sectors. Further, we have seen the differing intent, 
at least publicly, behind the scholarships discussed 
and narratives surrounding them. 
 
There is certainly a dearth in literature focusing on 
the interaction and flows between higher 
EUC Working Paper No. 23 
 
11 
 
education and soft power in the EU and Asia, as 
well as comparative studies in the field. It is hoped 
that this paper will trigger more research into 
these areas.  Future research could involve 
longitudinal studies as a method of investigating 
and measuring correlations between the 
internationalisation of higher education (and 
scholarships) and its efficacy as a soft power 
strategy. Stetar et al (2010: 201) notes that 
“nations and groups will likely continue to 
cooperate, but also use higher education to 
compete with their perceived rivals; it seems 
inevitable that nations will use universities as a 
primary means to project their soft power and gain 
strategic political advantage.” It remains to be seen 
if this holds true in an era of diversified information 
mediums.
EUC Working Paper No. 23 
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